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EQUALIZERS AND TRANSLATORS:
LAWYERS' ETHICS IN A CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY
Martin B6hmer*
INTRODUCTION
Lawyers' ethics change. Many would agree on this statement. The
content of their moral obligations, some would claim, varies along with the
different necessities of the lawyer's different clients. And as those
necessities change, the lawyer's commitments to truth and justice are
forgotten in order to make space for the defense of any interest the new
client brings to his or her office. Democracy, politics in general, has no
place in this picture. It amounts to nothing more than a particular process
of lawmaking that provides lawyers the basic raw material to do their job.
In what follows I propose a different view of the practice lawyers have to
embody, while at the same time acknowledging that, in fact, lawyers' ethics
do change.
I. A DEMOCRATIC PROPOSAL
A few decades ago, an important part of humanity decided we should live
together in accordance with an ideal that asserts that the best public decision
is the one taken unanimously by everyone who is potentially affected by it,
and only after discussing all the relevant information available and
evaluating the best arguments their deliberative ability allowed them to
express.
What moral theory, both from a metaethical and a normative ethics
perspective, may arise from recognizing this fact? What, if any, political
theory may arise from this moral theory? What, if any, theory about the
role of law may arise from this political theory? What, if any, theory about
the role of judges may arise from this theory about the role of law? What, if
any, theory about the role of lawyers may arise from this theory about the
* Director of the Law Area, Universidad de San Andr(s; Director of the Justice Area, Centro
de Implementaci6n de Politicas Pblicas Para ]a Equidad y el Crecimiento. I could not have
completed this essay without the help of Sara Niedzwiecki and Celeste Braga. Many of the
observations that polish the broad reasoning that I try to defend here came up in
conversations with Paola Bergallo and Gustavo Maurino, who I especially thank. The
accurate observations of Mariano Ferndndez Valle, to whom I am also grateful, were
properly included.
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role of judges? And what, if any, theory about the teaching of law, about
the role of professors, and about the schools of law may arise from these
theories about the role of judges and lawyers?
This essay answers the second-to-last question, avoids the last one and
makes good use of the answers Carlos Nino gave to the remaining four.
Thus, I will try to show the power of his thought and how grateful I am for
his contribution. Neither is in doubt, only my ability to make them clear.
A. Ideal Deliberation
1. The Human Predicament
If one believes that human beings are an experiment of the gods, it seems
clear that, at this moment, we do not have conclusive reasons to evaluate
this positively or negatively. We have been close to self-destruction and we
have also developed practices of which we can be proud. In any way, we
would have, like Job, reasons for complaint. In fact, the experiment of
which we are the object is as cruel as the bet between God and Satan in the
Book of Job. The experiment' consists of placing us on a planet that lacks
the necessary resources to allow our lives to unfold in the way we would
desire. Because of this, we have no other alternative but to coordinate our
actions or destroy those who try to stand between us and the goods we need
to satisfy our desires. However, our abilities to perform one thing or the
other are, like all human resources, limited. Besides being limited, our
strength and intelligence are relatively equal, as well as our ability for
empathy and collective coordination.
2. Metaethics: Modem Moral Discourse
What makes us an experiment that has not yet failed is the fact that we
have achieved, from time to time, the creation of rules that allow us to
coordinate our efforts and collaborate instead of increasing conflicts and
trying to conquer one another.
When the principle of authority is questioned as the regulating principle
of the game of public decisions, a new game, called the moral discourse of
modernity, 2 is created. The arguments we use in this game have some
specific features. These features include: generality (in the sense that I
cannot say, for instance, that something is right because it is convenient for
a certain person); universalizability (in the sense that I have to be willing to
make my judgment universal, including against myself); a certain
agreement on evidence (the idea about how we understand that a fact takes
1. Carlos Santiago Nino quotes Geoffrey Warnock's The Object of Morality when
referring to these circumstances as ."the basic human predicament."' CARLOS SANTIAGO
NINO, THE ETHICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 66 (1991) [hereinafter NrNO, HUMAN RIGHTS] (quoting
G. J. WARNOCK, THE OBJECT OF MORALITY 23-26 (1971)).
2. See CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, THE CONSTITUTION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 47(1996) [hereinafter NINO, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY]; NINO, supra note 1, at 71-72.
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or does not take place, and, correspondingly, the need for some procedural
or intersubjective verification of this fact); and publicity (I cannot say
something is right in accordance with a principle I cannot make explicit). 3
However, in this moral discourse of modernity, we generally assume that
it would be good for every participant in the discussion to have the same
level of information, the same level of rationality, and the same ability to
persuade. This is why the level where the moral discourse of modernity
takes place is ideal. Ideally, the way in which the moral discussion is
carried out implies that the group of individuals involved in the solution of
the case can hold a discussion having the same level of rationality, of
relevant information, and of persuasive ability. And if these individuals end
up unanimously agreeing, it seems that this reason over which everyone
unanimously agrees is better than the decision made by only one person
without all the information, and without rational arguments.4 Therefore, in
this outline, the ideal of rational moral deliberation is being all present,
having as much information as possible and the same ability to imagine
rational arguments, and being able to persuade using the same kind of
rhetoric.
Now, if that is the ideal-if that is the regulating principle that we should
all obey when entering into public discussion-there are things we cannot
say unless we violate the very thing we are doing. This is what Nino calls a
"pragmatic inconsistency." 5  In a moral discussion, those who discuss
assume some things; otherwise, they would not be discussing, or at least
would not be discussing in that particular way. And if things are said that
are in conflict with the premises of the practice, their discourse becomes
inconsistent, giving those premises their critical ability.
Once we agree with this metaethical move, we are trapped inside the
game. The undeniable existence of alternative and overlapping moral
schemes in a specific time in history does not invalidate the fact that the
only way to argue is with the guidelines offered by a certain discourse.
Beyond that discourse, it is impossible to speak; beyond any discourse there
is only silence, violence, or luckily, mere indifferent tolerance. In this
sense, the idea I develop is classified as conceptual relativism. The
argumentative correction depends on the discursive game we are playing.
From an external point of view, the argument is relative; from an internal
point of view, the argument aims to become true.
3. See NINO, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 122; NINO, HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 1, at 93-94.
4. NINO, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 127-28; NINO, HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 1, at 248.
5. NINO, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 27; NINo, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 1, at 12.
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3. Normative Ethics: Moral Principles
Thus, once we agree, even in an implicit manner, to belong to a
community that develops the moral discourse of modernity to diminish
conflicts and increase coordination, we should accept-if we do not want to
be considered pragmatically inconsistent-that some moral principles arise
from the premises of the ideal discussion. 6
First, the personal autonomy principle: it is of great value that each
individual can freely decide how to develop his or her life. What proves
that this is a moral principle underlying the deliberative practice is that, if I
discuss, or morally deliberate with somebody else, it is because I believe
the other person has the ability to elaborate arguments of his or her own and
also the ability to understand and critically evaluate mine. 7
Second, the inviolability principle: one's autonomy should not be
increased by diminishing the autonomy of others. Thus, if I speak to
everybody else, I cannot make use of them; if I speak, it is because they are
not an instrument of my autonomy; I have to respect their will to do
different things from the ones I would want them to do. 8 The master does
not discuss with his slave.
Third, the principle of dignity: the will of others should be respected
even if this implies a decrease in one's own autonomy. It is in this way that
we can agree on a bilateral contract. We can only increase our autonomy
by diminishing the autonomy of others-if they allow it. This conclusion is
deduced from premises of deliberation, for if I will not take what the other
person tells me seriously, why would I be speaking with him or her?9
However, this ideal moral deliberation is, just that-an ideal; it does not
exist in the real world. This is due to at least two reasons. First, because, as
I mentioned before, in the ideal deliberation, all those affected by the result
of the discussion are present, which, most of the time, becomes impossible
when the subject is relevant enough and affects a lot of people. Second,
ideal deliberation does not exist because it requires unanimity; that is, it
requires that we have enough time so that all of us who are interested try to
persuade one another until a consensus is achieved, at least temporarily.
And this cannot happen in reality either, because we typically have neither
the time nor the ability to achieve those agreements. Not to mention other
reasons such as asymmetry regarding the access to relevant information or
the rhetorical inequality of the participants-that I refer to later.
6. See NINO, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 46-47.
7. See NINO, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note, 2, at 48-50; see also NINO,
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 129-85.
8. See NINO, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 50-51; NINO, HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 186-228.
9. See NINO, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 51-53; NINO, HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 164-85.
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4. Political Philosophy: Deliberative Democracy
We now find ourselves leaving the implications of normative ethics of
the metaethical position assumed by the deliberative ideal to dwell on its
translation to reality; we are now in the kingdom of political theory. Are
these flaws of real deliberation reason enough to reject it? Let us remember
that the deliberative ideal is a critical ideal, its purpose is not to describe
reality, but to reveal the normative principles of a social practice that have
the ability to evaluate actions. This is why the deliberative ideal constitutes
a positive utopia' 0 with the capacity to suggest and criticize courses of
action.
The political proposal of this moral theory consists of presenting a
system of government that can get close to this moral ideal. This form of
government is a modem creation known as a constitutional democracy. In
other words, in the level of reality, democracy is the best option to make
this ideal effective; it is the imperfect political substitute of modem moral
deliberation.'1  Thus, democracy reproduces certain conditions of
impartiality that make it possible for this political system to help us make
better decisions than any other process of collective decision making.
These conditions, among others, are implied by the fact that we all have
an equal opportunity to take part because we have enough information and
because there are certain argumentative conditions that force us to
deliberate and, in this way, reduce the use of violence, avoid factual errors,
and allow time to ponder the consequences of a given decision
appropriately. Hence, these conditions of impartiality (which lead to the
existence of different levels of democracy even if there is a minimal
threshold under which we can affirm that a decision is not democratic) give
us reasons to believe that the adopted decision has more chances of being
the right one than any other taken by another procedure. 12
B. Real Deliberation: Democracy Failures
Democracy tries to approach ideal deliberation by creating the best
political arrangements so that as many opinions as possible are expressed,
so that the best arguments are heard (in accordance with the culture and the
imaginative capacity available at that moment in that specific society).
Thus, decisions are made with the highest possible level of agreement
(when unanimity is not a possibility), taking into consideration as much
relevant information as possible.
Therefore, since democracy is only a substitute to ideal moral
deliberation, what makes it imperfect generates several problems. In the
first place and regarding the creation of public policy, which takes place at
10. See NINO, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 47.
11. Id. at 146-47; NINO, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 244.
12. See NINO, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 147-49; NINO, HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 22-55.
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the legislative level, we find that the problem of representation arises, 13
given that not all of us can be present at the process of deliberation.
Secondly, the majority rule problem: since we do not have enough time for
unanimity, we have to vote at a given time, and we do so by using the
majority rule.
The problem is that since there are representatives who decide by
majority rule, or that the representatives came to be so in a less than perfect
way, there may be individuals or groups that should be present in the
deliberation, because their interests might be affected by the results, but are
left out of the democratic discussion. These representation problems
require the creation of adequate political party systems, electoral
mechanisms, mechanisms of parliamentary design, guarantees of freedom
of several expressions, and access to information. The deliberative ideal
has a great capacity for proposal and criticism of the fundamental
institutions of democracy, evaluations and proposals to which I now turn. 14
No matter how well designed they could be, these mechanisms do not
remove the threats of the majority rule.
One of those threats is the possibility that the decisions taken by real
democracy-the majorities that managed to win the democratic game-
violate the rights of individuals or groups, in which case they would be
violating the premises by which we justify the democratic system (the
moral principles assumed in the ideal deliberation that justify the existence
and respect of those rights).
C. A Constitution
In view of the failures brought about by real democracy left to its own, it
is necessary to create an agency that defends the democratic procedures
(making them more deliberative) and the substantive principles of the
system, that does not depend on the will of the majority. We need someone
to protect the rules of the game of deliberative democracy in a
countermajoritarian way-by taking a position against the majority without
being politically punished for it. The most important of these mechanisms
is the judiciary, whose role is even more relevant when judges have
political power because they exercise the constitutional countermajoritarian
control par excellence.
However, this countermajoritarian instrument must be justified since, at
first, it appears to be opposed to the principles of deliberative democracy. 15
13. NtNO, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 171-75. Note that, for the
deliberative conception of democracy, representation is a problem, in contrast to, for
example, the pluralist conception of democracy, for which representation constitutes an
advantage. Id. at 146, 171.
14. Id. at 144-86.
15. The idea that only one person alone believes he or she understands the principles of
a constitution better than the people's representatives seems to be very distant from the
deliberative ideal of self-government, where all the interested parties participate in the
process of collective decision making.
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We would certainly all find unattractive the idea that judges are the
governors in a democracy, and we would think that it is the people who
should govern. But we also hope there is someone who exercises some
kind of control over the decisions made by the people, particularly to make
sure that the principles that make us want to live in a democratically
controlled political community are respected. Thus, tension arises from the
idea of democracy, inapposite to the idea of a constitution.
A deliberative point of view of democracy justifies this role of judges,
underlining that, just as in economic theory, where state intervention is
justified when the market fails (to regulate monopolies, for example), in the
deliberative tradition, the countermajoritarian agency is justified when
democracy fails.
We then find what Nino calls the exceptions to the unrestricted respect of
the popular will. 16  These exceptions are, in principle, two. First, the
protection of the principles. This implies that, although we defer our
judgment to the decision made by real democracy when it works
reasonably, if real democracy evidently violates these principles that are
assumed by the ideal moral deliberation, then judges must intervene. 17
Second, the protection of processes, that is, the control of rules that
restrict or distort the processes that allow democracy to produce legislation
justified by deliberation. This would be the case, for example, if electoral
districts were arranged in a way that systematically benefited the same
group. If that happens, it is reasonable to think that judges should get
involved, even though the rule does not violate substantive principles, for
the rules of the game (which are the ones that let us say that what emerges
from this game is democratically justified) are being broken. Given the two
exceptions and in terms of the role of the judges, we can say that the role of
judges is to (a) preserve a justified (read: principles) (b) game (read:
processes).
There is, however, a third problem. It is still possible for a judge in one
province to think that a rule violates principles while another judge in
another province thinks it does not; for a division of the intermediate court
to think it does and another one to think it does not; for the highest court as
presently composed to think it does and in the future, with a different
Judges, particularly those in higher courts, such as a supreme court or a
constitutional tribunal, do not generally enjoy a direct democratic origin, since
they are not elected by popular vote. Furthermore, these courts are not typically
subject to a periodic renewal of their mandate, nor do they respond directly to
public opinion and discussion.
Id. at 187-88. In this way, "doubt arises as to why the judiciary-aristocratic organ-should
have the last word in determining the scope of individual rights, conflicts of powers between
the branches of government, and the rules regarding the democratic procedures....
Alexander Bickel labeled this problem 'the counter-majoritarian difficulty."' Id. at 188.
16. They are exceptions, for if real democracy had a game as close to ideal deliberation
as possible, one would try to prevent countermajoritarian agencies from intervening.
17. In Argentina, for example, obvious violations of principles would refer to violations
of the Constitution, since principles in general are expressed in constitutions that make them
explicit, such as the principle of equality or of autonomy. CONST. ARG. §§ 16, 19.
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composition, to think it does not. The system seems attractive insofar as the
instrument with which the judges modify democratic decisions when they
violate principles or processes, or respect them in the opposite case, is
consistent.
We thus find a third exception with which judges may justify their
interference in majoritarian deliberation, given that they must also maintain
and protect the consistency of the language with which they express
themselves. Thus, to honor a constitution means preserving the social
hermeneutical practice it consists of while improving in accordance with the
values that each generation understands are expressed in society's basic
institutional agreement.
This is how constitutional democracies create countermajoritarian
mechanisms with the purpose of preserving: (a) the rights on which the
system is founded, (b) the rules of the democratic game, and (c) the
consistency of the language that makes the game possible in time. The
judiciary is an institution (not necessarily the only one) designed to play the
difficult part of protecting these principles and, at the same time, of
respecting the agreements reached by the democratic processes,
understanding that its countermajoritarian role must always be in tension
with the respectful deference owed to the will of those who reached broader
agreements.
So far the inertial powers of Nino's thought enlighten us so that we can
see where this path leads us.
II. THE ROLE OF LAWYERS
A. Failures of Judicial Deliberation
The ideal of deliberation has no reason to be limited to the legislative or
administrative bodies. There are other political fora in which to act. Courts
are one of them. In the courtrooms, people discuss the way in which
democratic agreements are applied to their specific problems, and certain
officers, such as the judges, assume their role as arbiters in those
controversies. Thus, when deciding them, they have the triple opportunity
to: (a) polish the arguments provided by the legislature in favor of the
general rules for that particular case; (b) protect the premises of the
deliberative game in which the democratic system exists by offering a
second opportunity to those who lost in the part of the game where the rule
of the majority governs; and (c) continue the construction of the language
of law, preserving its meaning and improving it in accordance with the
changing ideas regarding the principles that give it its value. The first task
is nothing but the continuation of the legislative function, the application of
general prescriptions to specific cases, and the exemplification of a general
law. The second, the exercise of the countermajoritarian control, is
generally executed in occasion of the first one and in an exceptional way.
The last one is a permanent concern assumed as a tension between past and
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present, preservation and change, in which judges must feel uncomfortably
at ease.
Thus, deliberation also takes place, though in a very different way, in the
sphere in which the rule is applied and not only in the sphere of its creation.
In the judicial process, a part of what happens in the majoritarian discussion
is repeated, given that it also represents a sphere of public deliberation that
aims at finishing the conversation only when the best argument has silenced
the other party's voice. In this way, a deliberative process can determine
(a) how to distinguish general mandates, (b) whether a democratic rule falls
or does not fall within the exceptions regarding the unrestricted respect of
the general will, and (c) in what way the tension between tradition and
reform can be resolved within the particular case.
It is easy to understand that this task is impossible to carry out by only
one person alone. The principles on which democracy is based reject the
elitist approach of thinking that such an important task can be successful
without the benefit of the presence of those interested in the result of the
decision. Thus, the role of people, different from the judges in the judicial
discussion, becomes meaningful. It is no longer only the judges who gather
information, ask, and deliberate among themselves, but also the people
(who are by definition the ones that can encourage deliberation wherever it
takes place) who start the judicial apparatus (given that judges do not act on
their own initiative), bring the arguments and the proof, and go back to
deliberating because they do not agree with what laws require from them or
because they state that, even when the mandate is clear, democracy failed in
the protection of rights, or distorted the good performance of the democratic
processes, or did not take into account the subtle construction supposed by
the careful process of respect and improvement of a constitution.
The deliberative process in court is, however, different from the
deliberative process in the majoritarian bodies. In fact, in court,
conversation is regulated in detail and coordinated by an arbiter who is
impartial regarding the interests and has, as I mentioned before, a very
specific role to carry out, a role that has been translated to detailed rules and
that we can summarize in the idea that judges must "apply the law."
In a court, the ideal decision is achieved after a deliberative process in
which the best argument prevails, constrained by the (legal) restrictions that
limit the function of the judge. In this framework, in which judges listen to
the good (legal) arguments and decide based on the good (legal) arguments,
for the law in general to develop, the parties to the controversy must make
an effort to bring to the judges the best arguments available in society at
that moment regarding the way in which the rules must be interpreted and
applied, subject to the tensions that make a constitutional democracy work.
However, just as real democracy fails because it does not coincide with
ideal democracy, insofar as representatives do not coincide with those
affected and as majorities do not guarantee the same decisions that would
have been taken unanimously, real courts are also subject to failures that
prevent them from creating an ideal deliberation. One of these failures is
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the complexity of the language of the law and the fact that the best
arguments tend to lie in understandings that, for reasons that I later discuss,
are only shared by the members of the legal community, thus excluding the
rest of the citizens from this important conversation.
This failure is generated by an imbalance between the actors regarding
their capacity to generate the best argument to persuade the judge, which
creates the risk that the decisions that are made in court do not contribute to
fulfilling the fundamental role that countermajoritarian bodies have in a
constitutional democracy, since it would not be the best argument but the
best arguer who won. It is because of these reasons that constitutional
democracy creates a figure that functions as a mediator between the
individual interests and the public interest: the lawyer.
1. Lawyers as Rhetorical Equalizers of Their Fellow Citizens
It is this dilemma, in which the deliberation in court should make the best
arguments prevail (and therefore be open to the contribution of as many
people as possible), but in which, however, the best arguments only emerge
out of complex agreements and subtle compromises among the ideals of the
constitutional democracy, where democracy calls a particular professional
class to mediate between the judiciary and the citizens.
I will use an analogy between lawyers and their classic predecessors, the
sophists, to better understand the role we believe lawyers should have in a
constitutional democracy. This analogy is useful as long as it illustrates the
complex connection between democracy and judicial deliberation, and the
paradoxical need of restricting the access of many to deliberation on their
rights to defend a system based precisely on the value of widespread
deliberation.
Lawyers are recognized as the heirs of Greek sophists and that is the
reason why their activities, in the way they have been described in the
platonic dialogues-that is to say the defense of any cause for money, the
ability to produce arguments in favor of a certain interest one day and of the
opposite interest on the following day, and the disregard for the search for
truth-are Socratic disgraces of which the legal profession still bears the
burden. Thus, it seems important to return to these questions to redefine
them in the framework of contemporary deliberative democracy.
In the dialogue we know as Gorgias,18 Socrates draws a fruitful
comparison. He asserts that there are arts corresponding to the well-being
of the soul and of the body. Thus, politics, and within it, legislation and
justice, are to the soul what gymnastics and medicine are to the body.
Legislation keeps the political body, the polis, healthy and in good
condition, just as gymnastics keeps our body fit. Justice intervenes after the
occurrence of damage, trying to restore the equilibrium that the polis had,
just as medicine does with a sick body. However, these arts may be
18. PLATO, GORGIAS (Robin Waterfield trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1994).
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corrupted when the human being chooses to listen the' voice of flattery.
Thus, between gymnastics and cosmetic art, "men who had no more sense
than children,"' 19 Socrates states, will choose an easy expedient of makeup
to the hard discipline of physical exercise, and between the art of medicine
and the culinary arts, they will choose the tasty dish and not the bitter
medicine. Finally, Socrates concludes his explanation asserting that the
sophistic art and rhetoric are to politics (to legislation and justice) what
cosmetics and culinary arts are to gymnastics and to medicine: mere sham
conceived by flattery.
The dialogue must tend to the search for truth; rhetoric, on the contrary,
corrupts the dialogue turning it into a mere means of persuasion, that is, of
imposition of the will of the stronger over the weaker. Sophists, when
promoting this corrupt way of the democratic dialogue, increase the
arbitrariness of the powerful and prevent the polis and each of the citizens
from becoming better.
However, some context can show another perspective. In democratic
Athens, sophists taught rhetoric to their fellow citizens because rhetoric was
needed to persuade other citizens and win in the agora. The life and death
of everybody depended on the task of persuading others, as Socrates
himself could experience when unable to convince his fellow citizens-
although for a few votes-that the accusations against him were false.20
Not only legislation but also judicial decisions were solved by public
deliberation among the Athenians and the destiny of the first democracy
mankind has known depended on the decisions that emerged from the
persuasive ability of these few hundred people. This is the crucial
importance of the role of sophists, the one that gave them the public
prominence that Socratic dialogues could not hide. But the mere fact that
the sophists had a democratic reputation cannot justify the role of rhetoric
in a democratic system; therefore it requires going back to the mechanics of
the rhetorical dialogue to find a way of justifying their work.
If public deliberation is the source of political and judicial decisions, then
it is also the mechanism that is preferred to reach the best decisions. If they
had rejected the dialogue as the last source of certainty, the Athenians
should have deferred their most important decisions to some other
authority. From the absence of this superior court, it follows that
deliberation guaranteed them the best possible decisions. Consequently, the
rules that define it should have been aimed at sustaining this
epistemological definition of the Athenian people.
A bad decision is the result of poor deliberation, and poor deliberation
allows weak arguments to remain unrefuted. The role of sophists was to
teach precisely how to raise arguments and to expound on them in a
persuasive way, but mainly their role was to teach this technique (the art of
19. PLATO, GORGIAS (Benjamin Jowett trans.), http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/gorgias.lb.txt
(last visited Feb. 25, 2009); see also PLATO, supra note 18, at 32-34.
20. PLATO, THE APOLOGY (Charles W. Eliot ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., P. F. Collier &
Son 1909).
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playing with the rules of public deliberation) to all the citizens. From the
universal training of the players on the subtleties of the art of deliberation it
follows that the game grows in sophistication, and that the most blatant
errors in reasoning-the rhetorical fallacies-will be quickly detected, to
the pleasure of the opponent and disgrace of the speaker who tried to
introduce them as legitimate arguments. From the fear of this possibility,
which grows as the best instruction from sophists is extended to everybody,
follows the decision to avoid the use of weak arguments and the incentive
to develop the best reasons to make the silence of the opponent signal the
victory until a new speaker comes up with a better argument.
So far, we can assume that the rhetoric bet of the sophists consisted in the
fact that, if all the Athenian citizens had the same level of rhetoric or at least
rhetorical inequality was not decisive, the democratic discussion would be
closer to ideal deliberation, since fallacies would be neutralized because
speakers would prevent themselves from expressing them in front of an
audience expert in the art of rhetoric.
Going back to our argument, political philosophy has recently focused
again on dialogue regarding its ability to produce, discover, get closer, or
give greater guarantees than other methods of placing us before what we
could call "moral truth." This return to dialogue has overcome many
situations among which the restoration of democracy, equality among
citizens, and the value of persuasion are worth mentioning. In fact, the
critique of representative democracy and the proposals to bring it closer to
face-to-face deliberation between those affected by the decisions of the
game are an instance of this trend. And the idea of decentralization that
federalism brings about, the principles of proportionality and representation
of the electoral systems, the trials by jury, community justice, and the
alternative systems of conflict resolution are some of the clearer examples.
Chief among them is the idea that as the number of voices included in the
dialogue increases-with the purpose of persuading others who do not
share the same interests on the correctness of proposals (thus increasing the
relevant information and the number of arguments)-the more impartial
deliberations will be. Therefore, there will be more reasons to believe one
must act accordingly.
Nino has also reminded us that representation and the rule of the majority
are an obstacle to the deliberative ideal since they move us away from the
ideal of the presence of all those affected and away from unanimous
decision. What I want to point out now is another problem that threatens
deliberation and that brings us nearer to the role of the sophists. The
problem we refer to is the rhetorical inequality of those who participate in
deliberation. In fact, if the solution of a conflict depends on the rhetorical
effectiveness of the parties, the lack of equality produces the unwanted
result of the best argument failing to always prevail, violating an obvious
rule of ideal deliberation that consists in excluding the fallacies and the
modulation of discourse as valid arguments in discussion. The rhetorical
abilities of the participants are irrelevant in ideal deliberation.
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However, it is clear that in real deliberations-on which the interests and
rights of citizens in real democracy depend-the unequal rhetorical ability
of the participants produces the unwanted result of making fallacious
arguments prevail, thus allowing the will of those who lack the best
arguments to prevail. Sophists understood this failure of deliberative
market in Athenian democracy and tried to solve it by offering their
services to every citizen that required them, with the purpose of improving
their rhetorical skills. The objective was to equalize deliberation in the
polis, ensuring at least that the rhetoric of the speakers did not turn to the
easy use of fallacious arguments, since, among good rhetorical speakers,
weak arguments are easily detected, and one runs the risk of being
embarrassed in public. Thus, with the previous mutual censorship of
rhetorical cheating, it is expected that the arguments that remain are the best
that a community can imagine at a given moment.
This is the professional heritage of lawyers, one of the roles they play in
deliberative democracy: being the rhetorical equalizers of their fellow
citizens and making sure that social conflicts are solved by resorting to the
best argument their community has been able to express. This is why
modem states tend to give them the privilege of the monopoly over
rendering justice, and to restrict the access of citizens in general to judicial
deliberation with the purpose of assuring their equality.
That being said, a final note: lawyers are not really necessary in all
instances in which we are accustomed to requiring their presence. In fact,
insofar as the subject in discussion does not permit a rise to complex
questions in which what I have called public interest may be at risk, and as
long as the parties have relatively equal rhetorical skills, the justification for
the existence of lawyers as translators and equalizers disappears. Thus, it is
not only permissible but necessary to leave lawyers out of these
circumstances. Some examples are community justice and noncontentious
procedures in which the absence of lawyers increases the possibility to
access the justice of citizens in general.
2. Lawyers as Translators from the Language of Private Interests to the
Language of the Public Interest
In this particular form of political dialogue in constitutional democracy,
judicial deliberation, citizens are confronted with unequal instruments,
since they do not know to the same extent what statutory law demands, they
do not have the same information about all the relevant facts, they have
uncontested prejudices, and they do not know how to articulate their
arguments in a persuasive way. It is precisely because they have unequal
information and rhetorical abilities that they need representatives-
lawyers-to provide them the weapons with which to fight the deliberative
battle in a fair way.
This deliberative battle has relatively well-defined rules. The dynamics
that include the judge, two lawyers, and two parties is a very interesting
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deliberation, and very different from the political deliberation that takes
place in a deliberative council or in the national legislature. In the former,
two citizens turn to the judicial institutions because they have a problem of
normative interpretation. Each believes that the law admits he or she is
right, but law is, however, a very complex practice formed by facts and
rules and is a far cry from an oracle or a infallible and precise computer.
The person who decides is, all things considered, one person, the judge,
who is not known in advance but it is assumed to have some interesting
institutional features that result in a negative rule of the game: judges are
not interested in the client's interests, that is, they cannot be persuaded with
arguments based on personal interests, needs, or desires, so these types of
arguments are left out of judicial deliberation. Judges are there to interpret
what the law says, and in that sense they are representatives of the public
interest. The arguments that cannot be expressed following the
requirements of modern deliberation-for example, generality and
universalizability-are not in the interest of those who must decide the
complex network of mandates that constitutional democracy imposes on
them.
In fact, judges want to know how to exemplify the majoritarian decision
in the case in question, or if they should disregard the popular mandate
because in such a case the principles on which the system is founded or the
rules on which the democratic decision is based are at stake, or if they
should repeat what they have said before in a similar case, or if there are
arguments to modify those previous decisions. Judges force lawyers to
express arguments that persuade the judges that the lawyers' clients are
backed by the best arguments-those that the judges would adopt to carry
out their task with wisdom, taking into account that the procedure is public
and that their arguments would be refuted by the lawyer representing the
opposing party.
Thus, lawyers must decide diverse and complex questions. First, they
must seek to protect the interest of their clients, which is many times
difficult to determine. In fact, is the client's interest the one he or she
manifests, or the one the lawyer believes it should be? If the client is not an
individual but an association, is the client's interest the interest of the board
of directors, of the shareholders, of the employees, of the consumers, or of
society in general? Second, once the client's interest is clear, lawyers must
place themselves in the client's place and decide what the best arguments in
his or her favor are. Third, they must leave the client's place, put
themselves in the opposing party's place, and imagine the arguments that
they would use if they were the opposing lawyer and-since ideally they do
not know the opposing lawyer-they must decide what would be the best
argument the opposing lawyer could express. The second and third steps
must be repeated as many times as necessary, similar to chess where the
players foresee future moves before making the following move. But
besides all this work, which requires a high level of deliberative
imagination, every lawyer must always be thinking about the judge, who is
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not interested in knowing the interests of each of the parties, to the extent
that promoting private interests does not constitute a persuasive argument
for the execution of his or her institutional work. In other words, lawyers
must be aware that the judge is only interested in hearing what the law says.
Those responsible for the decisions in the judicial deliberative game only
want to know if certain sanctioned law is relevant to the case and, if so, if it
violates any principle or process, or if its interpretation is contradictory to
some relevant interpretation held in the past, and, if this is the case, which
interpretation must prevail and why.
Thus, since the lawyers know that the judge wants to decide the case by
bearing in mind complex mandates, the arguments that they must put
forward in favor of their party relate to the interest of the judge. The
arguments in favor of the private interest of their party must be arguments
of public interest and, therefore, to be effective, lawyers must be able to
translate private interests effectively to the complex language of the public
interest.
A few words on the lawyers who devote themselves to advising their
clients: at first glance, it seems that arguments needed to succeed in the
discussions that do not take place in court do not require lawyers to put
themselves in the place of the judge. In fact, the abilities needed for a
successful negotiation might require the lawyer to relax the demands for
impartiality, information, or openness that are recommended for discussions
in court. However, in the majority of these transactions it is crucial to take
into account that the parties assume that the agreement they will reach will
be supported by rituals that make it valid in the sense that if one of the
parties fails to observe the law, the other party can resort to the monopoly
of public force to redress such noncompliance. Note that the guardian of
the legitimate use of public force is the judiciary. Thus, even in
extrajudicial transactions, the parties' lawyers must ask themselves what a
judge would say should the agreement need to be taken to court.21
Therefore, lawyers serve two masters: their clients and the judges. They
serve their clients by generating arguments that persuade the judge to
decide in accordance with their interests, and they serve the judges by
creating the best arguments they can express in favor of their clients to
allow the judges to perform their role, namely: to balance the respect for
majoritarian decisions; to protect rights and democratic processes; and to
preserve and improve the language of law. This double role is so important
that in many countries lawyers have the monopoly (either legal or de facto)
of representation before the court.
2 1. See generally ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSIONS 173 (4th prtg. 1995); Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a
Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REv. 255 (1990).
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B. A Justified Monopoly
So far, I have justified a certain role of the judges, and therefore of
lawyers, in a constitutional democracy and explained the rules of the
deliberative game of law in which judges can only be persuaded with
certain types of arguments. I have stated that the arguments that succeed in
achieving a favorable decision to the client are those that best comply with
the three types of requirements that fall on the judges: that they are deferent
to the popular will, that they prevent the violation of rights and the
manipulation of democratic processes exercising their countermajoritarian
role, and that they maintain and improve the practice that law involves.
Thus, if a lawyer is able to translate the interests of his or her client into
arguments that persuade the judge that the decision he or she is about to
make is the one that best combines these three elements, the lawyer should
win the case.
This translation is a very difficult task to carry out, and people must go
on with their lives and cannot dedicate themselves to developing these
abilities. This would justify, prima facie, the lawyers' monopoly in a
constitutional democracy, which in principle seems paradoxical to the
extent that it would deprive citizens of the right to defend their rights by
themselves, and not through representation. In other words, although
nobody is a better judge of one's own interests than oneself, the problem of
judicial deliberation is that the judge does not care about the individual
interest of each party; he or she only cares about the interest insofar as it is
sustained by arguments that can be translated into arguments of public
interest.
If this is the justification of the monopoly of public deliberation in the
hands of lawyers, how can we break down these obligations to understand
in particular what the obligations of lawyers are in a constitutional
democracy?
1. Lawyers Must Defend Their Clients' Interest
This mandate means that in the exercise of their profession, lawyers
cannot disappoint their clients regarding their needs and desires, which
seems obvious through its application, though is not so. In fact, how can
the client be identified, and therefore, the interests the lawyer must serve?
Is it the individual, his or her family, his or her children, or the
organization, to which they belong? Is it the public in general that the client
must serve? To fulfill the obligation of defending the interests of our client,
we must first ask ourselves what such an obligation entails. 22 Once there is
22. It is an extremely difficult question, and even if one agreed with Justice Louis
Brandeis when he proposes that lawyers should work for "the situation," the question is not
easier. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary on the
Nomination of Louis D. Brandeis to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, 64th Cong. 287 (1916).
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an agreement about who the client is and what his interests are, the lawyer
must decide the strategy to defend them.
The translation of private interest to public interest is complex and it is
important not to lose what the client came for in such a translation. What is
lost, because something is always lost, must be something the client accepts
to lose or knows he or she will lose. There are many obligations related to
the clients' right to information, their right to consent, their right to
confidentiality, even if the facts in question are important for the case, and
the limits that the lawyer imposes on his or her clients in a strategy to
defend their interests. That loss of information or interests that results from
the translation of the private interest into the public interest, which is
necessary for the lawyer, must be a translation that the clients know,
understand, and accept.
It is clear that the above overrides any kind of fraud to the clients: fraud
as a result of lack of information, or lack of consent, for example. I leave
aside more obvious questions traditionally discussed in the codes of
professional ethics (or in penal codes) such as the prohibition of stealing
their money, deceiving them about fees, lying to them, or not working in
their favor.
2. Monopoly Must Be Exercised Respecting Equality
The second justification of lawyers' monopoly is that. the deliberative
process of which law consists must be open to everybody, of the same
quality and accessibility, and therefore lawyers' services must be rendered
in those conditions.
a. Equality Regarding the Quality of Service
Inequality in rhetorical competency or in the ability to translate private
interests to public arguments produces disastrous consequences for
deliberation regarding the application of the law. In fact, when a good
lawyer confronts a bad lawyer, it is possible that this inequality restricts the
arguments available to the judge and permits the introduction of fallacies in
the deliberation that are accepted as valid arguments, facts not adequately
proved, and, in turn, inadequate solutions to the tensions inherent in
constitutional democracy. 23 Thus, whether one is being represented by a
bad or good lawyer is of importance not only to the client, but also to the
interest of law, insofar as the absence of this relative equality in the quality
of legal representation in the deliberation introduces the risk of inadequate
arguments and the exclusion of arguments that have the virtue of improving
the quality of the rule of law. In this sense, the qualitative differences
among lawyers must not be too broad, and the clients should be able to
know when one lawyer is better than another.
23. See generally Alan Wertheimer, The Equalization of Legal Resources, in 17
PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 303 (1988).
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Regarding this last question, there are institutions that are obliged to
create certain public goods that reduce the cost of accessing this
information. One of these institutions is the school of law, which is
expected to include in its degree something about the quality of the lawyers
graduating from it, who are, in the case of Argentina, immediately allowed
to access the market.24 This is the first reason to control the quality of the
teaching of law and it is above all relevant to define the knowledge and
minimum skills that are expected from someone who has obtained a law
degree. Clients should not make inquiries about whether one degree is
better than another. The degree should have a value in itself, and thus
become a public good.
In this sense, then, there should be a quality requirement relatively equal
to all the lawyers that the system allows into the market, permitting them to
defend people's interests. Of course this obligation lies not only in the
schools of law but also in other institutions, and is particularly a
fundamental obligation of the state insofar as it is understood as a guarantee
of equality in the service of justice. But it is also an obligation of the bar
associations-since the state delegates the control of the profession to
them-to keep certain regularity in the quality of the service rendered by
their registered professionals.
b. Equality in Access
The justification of the enjoyment of this monopoly includes the duty to
defend particular interests with relatively equal rhetorical ability and with
the best legal arguments at everyone's reach. The distribution of lawyers
among those who need them cannot be related to their clients' wealth; their
particular geographic situation; their ability to access public buildings or to
understand the oral or written language of law; or their gender, race, or
social position-to name only some of the barriers that may hamper a
client's access to justice. From the accessibility point of view, even if there
are tolerable differences in the quality of lawyers, the market should not be
the distribution criterion controlling the service of justice. The mere fact
that one is better off or lives in a certain place should not guarantee a better
defense (or a mere defense), since this circumstance would be evidence of
the denial of the reasons why the monopoly was given to lawyers. The
monopoly is not given to lawyers so that a few become rich defending some
other few.
This is not the venue to offer proposals for an egalitarian extension of the
access to justice. However, it is important to insist once again that this
obligation is part of the necessary institutional offer of every constitutional
democracy and is therefore basically a responsibility of the state, no matter
how it is structured. This obligation can be honored using the resources
that the market generates through the legal profession, the state (through the
24. Since the academic degree permits the immediate exercise of the profession without
any other requirement.
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courts), the government attorney's office and the public defender's office,
the schools of law through the legal clinics, and civil society in general.
Thus the existence of an adequate public policy regarding the egalitarian
access to deliberation on the manner in which law should be applied is a
fundamental obligation of the state and is part of the issues that illustrate
how it complies with the requirements that justify its existence.
c. Monopoly Must Be Exercised in Accordance with the Obligation of
Consolidating the Rule of Law
Lawyers must not make decisions that undermine the instrument that
democracy gives them to fulfill their work. In this essay, I have defined
public interest in the sphere of justice as the balance of the three obligations
of judges (the respect for the majoritarian decisions, the countermajoritarian
control and the preservation and improvement of the language of law) and
the lawyer's job as dependent on those obligations in the sense that he or
she must be oriented to facilitate them. This collective practice of lawyers
is what is frequently identified with the rule of law in the judicial sphere. It
is in this sense that we state that the lawyers' monopoly is also justified
when it is exercised in such a way that it does not destroy the delicate
balance of obligations in which the rule of law exists.
That is, lawyers must restrict themselves and avoid breaking this
complex institutional practice, even when doing so would given them a
better opportunity to win their case. In the terms we have set out, lawyers
breach this obligation when they do not fully assume their role as
translators of private interests into public interest, but instead, in their
eagerness to defend the private interest of the client, distort the best
interpretation of what the public interest demands. In Latin America, many
aspects of the profession have never been related to the demand that this
standard requires. There are still many questions that could be described as
the obligation of exercising the legal profession in accordance with a strong
conception of the rule of law. Taken seriously, this obligation imposes a
heavy burden on those who try to make reforms for the consolidation of the
rule of law, because of the wide range of habits and rules that conflict with
this standard but are taken for granted as the usual, and in some sense,
correct way of doing things.
CONCLUSION
There is a certain attitude towards legal interpretation that continues
among us and conceives the law in a mere instrumental way, aligned with a
disdainful attitude toward the creation of arguments of public nature and
that states that any interpretation of the rules that satisfies the interests of
the client must be introduced in the process. However, just as it happens
with the judge, it is expected that the lawyer contributes to the construction
of the language of law. In this sense, the lawyer has to pay, on the one
hand, his or her obligations regarding the past, i.e., he or she must make
2009] 1381
1382 FORDHAMLA WREVIEW [Vol. 77
sure that the people's expectations of what the law requires are not betrayed
by the permanent change in the interpretation of the law. On the other
hand, he or she must honor his or her obligations regarding the future,
making sure that the law improves with regard to the deference he or she
owes to the will of the people, the respect of rights, and the improvement of
the legal practice.
In order to justify the expropriation and the monopoly of defense of the
rights of the people on whom it is sustained, legal practice must be
unconditionally faithful to the never-ending struggle to achieve the double
ideal of democracy and constitutionalism.
My proposal has argued, based on the teachings of Carlos Nino, that only
as long as the legal profession fulfills these three obligations-that of
defending the client's interest, permitting everyone equal access to the
judicial deliberation, and not defending the private interest at the expense of
the public interest-the task that constitutional democracy has
monopolistically assigned the legal profession is justified, and it can then
become a relevant actor in the building of the rule of law.
